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ABSTRACT 
The merger of police services in the UK has been suggested on the grounds that 
efficiency improvements will be possible.  This paper applies a public good model of 
the police service to evaluate the potential efficiency gains from mergers of police 
services in England and Wales.  We construct a dataset that reflects the public good 
nature of police service and allows for the exogenous imposition by Government of 
the level of police service budgets.  Our main finding is that English and Welsh police 
force mergers could lead to increases in police staff resource efficiencies between 
10% and 70%. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Since the 1960s and the introduction of efficiency measurement techniques of police 
forces, successive UK governments have tried to ensure that public funds were used 
in an ‘economic, efficient and effective’ manner.1  The ‘experiments’ in measuring 
the performance of police forces during the 1960s and 1970s led to many revisions, 
from input-output ‘operations management’ techniques to scorecards (for a discussion 
of early performance reforms see for example, Stephens, 1994; Sullivan, 1998; and 
Drake and Simper, 2001).  In the 1980s and 1990s performance indicators were 
introduced to analyse performance, and then in the second term of the new Labour 
government econometric techniques were advocated in the Spottiswoode (2000) 
report “Improving Police Performance”.  It is interesting to note that Spottiswoode 
advocated the use of Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) and Stochastic Frontier 
Analysis (SFA) as this would allow interactions between inputs and outputs in the 
policing function, thereby bypassing any of the failings in previous performance 
measurement programmes (which did not take costs explicitly in to account).   
However, in the third term of the new Labour government, the Home Office 
elected not to follow the recommendations of the Spottiswoode and promoted the use 
of an alternative ‘Spidergram’ approach in addition to Best Value Performance 
Indicators (BVPIs) (see for example, Drake and Simper, 2005, and The National 
Policing Plans 2003/04 and 2004/05).  These two techniques were again wholly 
output (outcome) based measurement programmes allowing the public to determine, 
using simple diagrams, whether their local police force could satisfy six domain 
                                                 
1  Indeed The Police Act 1964, s. 4.(1) states that “it shall be the duty of the Police Authority for every 
police area for which a police force is required to be maintained by section 1 of this Act to secure the 
maintenance of adequate and efficient police force for the area, and to exercise for that purpose the 
powers conferred on a police authority by this Act.” (our emphasis)  The managerialism of the police 
service, coming from the Home Office Circular 114/83 also introduced the three E’s: Economy, 
Efficiency and Effectiveness.  Subsequent legislation, the Police and Magistrates Court Act 1994 
replaced ‘adequate and efficient’ with ‘efficient and effective’ and finally The Local Government Act 
1999 introduced Best Value, such that:  “A Best Value authority must make arrangements to secure 
continuous improvement in the way in which its functions are exercised, having regard to a 
combination of economy, efficiency and effectiveness” (our emphasis). 
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criteria’s promoted on certain policing functions as specified by the Home Office.2  
The six domains in the ‘Spidergrams’ were: ‘reducing crime’, ‘investigating crime’, 
‘promoting public safety’; ‘citizen focus,’ and ‘resource usage.’  Hence, the aim of the 
‘Spidergrams’ was that these domains would show whether an individual police force 
was below a specified Home Office target or below an average obtained from a set of 
reference forces (known as ‘Most Similar Forces’ (MSFs)).  That is, in line with the 
Police Reform Act 2002, police forces would be assessed with respect to their 
performance of these six domains, although, their success or failure could not be 
based on the costs incurred or resources redeployed.3
 These ‘Spidergrams’ were consistent with the methodology introduced by the 
UK government in connection with ‘Best Value Performance Indictors’ (BVPIs) (see 
DETR, 1999).  They did not, however, follow the stated public policy aim of Value 
for Money (VFM).  In the Home Office report “What Price Policing?”, for example, it 
was stated that “police managers need to work harder to ensure that VFM is achieved, 
for competitive pressure has to be created internally.  The costing of activity with 
subsequent measurement and comparison of performance provide the means by which 
such encouragement is given” (HMIC Report, 1998, paragraph 10.)  Furthermore, by 
not linking outcomes to resource utilisation and costs, the Home Office was also not 
following the recommendation given in Spottiswoode where it stated that, “Best 
Value is the central plank in the drive to improve police performance.  A systematic 
measure of police efficiency – where “efficiency” is a measure of the polices 
performance in meeting their overarching aims and objectives for the money spent – 
is crucial if Best Value is to work effectively,” (page 4).  As alluded to previously, the 
report further advanced the use of nonparametric and parametric techniques such that 
                                                 
2  UK policing is split into 3 distinct political jurisdictions, The Police Service of Northern Ireland, The 
Police forces of Scotland, and those stationed in England and Wales.  This paper is concerned with the 
latter group of which the Home Office is responsible directly for their ‘economy, efficiency and 
effectiveness’ in policing matters. 
3  Indeed, instead of differential targets as proposed in Spottiswoode (2000), the Home Office criteria 
of forces “meeting an annual target of savings/efficiency gains equivalent to 2% of their annual 
budget” is to continue (National Policing Plan 2003/04, page 39). 
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“this approach would also mean that “efficiency” is about finding ways of improving 
the performance delivered for the money that each authority and force has” (page 5).4
 However, even though there are some failings by not implementing the 
Spottiswoode recommendations on measuring efficiency, the UK government has 
considered any increases obtained in the ‘Value for Money’ programme had possibly 
reached a ‘frontier’.  That is, after seven successful years of increasing police 
efficiency the Home Office has posited that any more future efficiency could be 
obtained through force mergers releasing additional scale, scope and further x-
efficiencies.  Hence, the Home Office began in 2005 consultative studies to determine 
possible merger efficiencies amongst police forces.  Indeed, as stated in the initial 
report, Her Majesties Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) found that, “the current 
structure and efficiency regime is not designed to yield a step change in VFM, nor 
easily support workforce modernisation.  Process and procurement reform might 
though be accelerated by the consolidation of forces in one form or another” 
(paragraph 30, page. 11).  Further, they find that “the NPV (Net Present Value) of 
merger savings and productivity gains could amount to £2,250 million” (paragraph. 
31, page. 11, O’Conner, 2005). 
The idea that there maybe efficiencies found in merging police forces is not 
new, see empirical studies by Cameron (1989) and Drake and Simper (2000).  
However, we believe that this is the first paper in this area to consider mergers by 
applying a non-parametric methodology for the measurement of the gains from actual 
mergers.  Our findings do not provide a complete cost-benefit analysis of the 
proposed mergers, since we do not calculate the transaction or adjustment costs of the 
mergers, nor do we compute the discounted present value of the net efficiency gains.  
Instead, we compare two different comparative static equilibria: one is the existing 
organisational structure of police services, the other is a set of different hypothetical 
merged structures in which the technical efficiency with which observed inputs are 
transformed to outputs is evaluated relative to the existing structure.  We describe a 
                                                 
4  Indeed, the UK Government press release associated with the Spottiswoode report, states, “this report 
identifies a systematic, comprehensive measure of relative police efficiency for the first time.  It 
recommends that efficiency estimates are used to set differentiated targets for forces, reflecting their 
room for improvement compared to the best forces.  This means that the targets would better reflect the 
current performance of each force and the environment they work within.” PSPP 4 Government Press 
Release, Home Office, 17th April 2000. 
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merger as advantageous if the merged services could operate with greater technical 
efficiency than the existing services.  
 The police service is often cited as a classic example of a public good as 
defined by  Samuelson (1956), since it can be argued that it provides a service which 
is both non-rival in consumption and non-excludable.  We use this idea to set up a 
framework in which the production activity of the police service uses exogenously 
determined inputs to provide two outputs, at least one of which has the characteristics 
of a pure public good, and the other output is provided by the public sector without a 
specific user charge. 
 The paper is organised as follows.  In Section II we discuss the background to 
in choosing our inputs and output specifications for our model.   Section III outlines 
the model and our interpretation of the non-parametric measurements.  We review, in 
that section, two aspects of the analytical basis; the first is the description of the 
production set that characterises the technology that we wish to discuss, while the 
second is the arguments relating to the measurement of the efficiency gains from 
mergers.  Section  IV presents our results on the potential efficiency gains from the 
proposed mergers and we conclude with Section V. 
 
 
II.  DATA AND MODEL SPECIFICATION FOR MEASURING POLICE 
FORCE MERGERS. 
 
The literature on modelling the efficiency of police forces has led economists to posit 
two alternative methodologies, the cost and the production approach (see Drake and 
Simper, 2003).  The former relates inputs/costs to possible outputs/outcomes (such as 
offences cleared); see early cost function examples of US policing by Darrough and 
Heineke (1979), Gyapong and Gyimah-Brempong (1988) and more recently Nyhan 
and Martin (1999); and for the UK, Cameron (1989), and Drake and Simper (2000).  
Whereas, the latter production methodology, relates the number of offences 
committed to the effectiveness of forces in offences cleared; see Thanassoulis (1995) 
for a UK example, Sun (2002) for a Taiwanese example, and finally Diez-Ticio and 
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Mancebon (2000) for an example of the production approach utilised to assess the 
efficiency of Spanish policing. 
There has been a wide range of output measures utilised in measuring police 
force efficiency.  For example, Darrough and Heineke (1979) use 1 input and 6 
outputs including 4 clear up rates, crimes against the person and population (to 
account for the service function of the police); Nyham and Martin (1999) have 2 
inputs and 3 outputs that include the number of crimes cleared, response time to 911 
calls, and the number of crimes.  Finally, in the case of English and Welsh police 
force analysis, Drake and Simper (2000 and 2001), for example, use 4 inputs but have 
different outputs.  In the former study these include: clear up rates, total traffic 
offences, and number of breathalyser tests, while in the latter study they use 5 outputs 
including: % of time officers spend patrolling the beat; violent crime clear up rate; 
burglary clear up rate; % success rate in answering a 999 call within a specified target 
time limit; and % of cases in which officers arrive at the scene of the crime within a 
specified time after a 999 call. 
 The above studies show that, when modelling police force efficiency, there are 
a considerable number of outputs that can potentially be included in the cost function 
specification.  These output (outcome) variable choices also depend on whether the 
investigator is interested in the preventive/proactive or response/reactive nature of 
policing (for a review of input/output specifications in policing, see Drake and 
Simper, 2003).  Spottiswoode noted the importance of proactive/preventive policing 
and proposed that any model should take into account all factors of policing.  That is, 
“the selected outcome measures capture the essence of police outcomes and thus, 
implicitly or explicitly, the many dimensions to policing.  The focus of the outcome 
measures should be on what the police are being expected to achieve for the money 
they have.  This is different from trying to model everything that forces do on a day-
to-day basis” (page. 16).  Hence, an efficiency model should have its 
outputs/outcomes based on a set of BVPIs from both the proactive/preventive and 
response/reactive methodologies. 
 However, this creates a difficulty in two respects.  Firstly, in choosing output 
variables from the large number (over 250) of Best Value Performance Indicators 
(BVPIs), Socio-economic, census, and other data sets available.  Secondly, in 
determining the quality of reporting and sampling techniques in the data collection.  
As the initial ‘demonstration project report’ (Home Office, 2001, precursor to the 
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final Spottiswoode) suggested, a number of criteria were used to assess the 
appropriateness of the data and they included: 
 
1. Data quality (including robustness and consistency between Police Forces) 
2. Consistency with the Government’s overall objectives 
3. The extent to which it might be manipulated by individual Police Forces. 
(Home Office, 2001, page. 19). 
 
 As this paper is concerned with the gains to efficiency from X-efficiencies and 
possible scale-efficiencies the model we follow is the cost approach.  We adopt a 
model of police service activity based on a previous study by Drake and Simper 
(2005).  There are two outputs ( )21 y,y=y  and four inputs ( )4321 x,x,x,x=x , and 
data on each is available for 43 police services for each of the years 2000-01, 2001-
02, 2002-03 and 2003-04.  The data are from various Home Office reports. 
The first output variables reflect success in solving reported crimes (y1), and is 
calculated as the ‘Number of Crimes Cleared Up’.  The number of cleared up crimes 
is a particularly good variable as it provides a measure of the success of the police in 
fighting and solving crimes, but also acts as a deterrent in the sense that criminals will 
assess the probability of being prosecuted ahead of committing a crime.  This so 
called response/reactive methodology of measuring policing can be found in a number 
of studies, including Todd and Ramanathan (1994), and Byrne et al (1996) who argue 
that, even though half of the police’s community work cannot be modelled, a 
production function can still be estimated.  They break down police activities in crime 
prevention “where the crime is contemplated but not committed,” and crime 
repression, where the “crime has occurred,” and use an argument from Schmidt and 
Witte (1984) that any criminal is likely to assess the probability of getting caught after 
committing a crime.  It is argued that the probability of arrest is linked to the number 
of arrests in a police force, and in particular to the number of convictions. 
 The second output variable is the ‘Index of Days of Police and Civilian 
Support Person Availability’, measured as a variable translation: [2×(max of sample 
days lost to sickness) - days lost to sickness].  With respect to output (outcome) 2, this 
corresponds closely with any of the key aims and objectives in policing.  Hence, it 
would clearly be desirable to reduce the incidence of sickness absence in police forces 
as it may well be that days lost are actually a symptom of underlying morale or 
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management problems, and may therefore be related to poor performance in other key 
output (outcome) areas.  In this paper we argue that output y2 has the characteristic of 
a public good since it represents the availability of a protective police service to meet 
public needs.  
 The input variables reflect the real resources available to the police and the 
number of crimes that require clear-up and follow previous ‘cost’ studies including 
Nyhan and Martin (1999) and Drake and Simper (2000).  These are measured as: 
 
x1 =  Total Net Budget in constant (2002) prices; the deflator is the UK GDP implicit 
deflator for gross value added at basic prices published by the Office of National 
Statistics 
x2 = Total Number of Violent Crimes 
x3 = Total Number of Material Crimes 
x4 = Other Recorded Crimes  
 
These inputs are treated as outside the control of each police service and so are 
assumed not to enter its decision making possibilities.  Budgets are set by central 
Government, and recorded crimes are a reflection of the environment in which each 
service operates.  The choices of each service are to devote the exogenously 
determined resources to clearing up crime and to providing a general service 
availability to the public – as in the lighthouse analogy from the theory of public good 
provision.   
An issue that has arisen in precious work in this area is whether police services 
in London (London Metropolitan, and London City) should be treated as outliers, 
since their operating characteristics and relative size make them exceptional within 
the context of England and Wales.  We compute all of our merger efficiency 
evaluations for two samples, with and without London Metropolitan, and London 
City, respectively comprising 43 and 41 police services.  The choice of benchmark 
sample is contingent also on the assumption that each service faces the same output 
valuation or imputed prices.  
 
TABLE 1 HERE 
 
FIGURE 1 HERE 
 8
 The proposed mergers are summarised in Table 1 and forces in England and 
Wales are presented in Figure 1, the mergers have been taken from the UK 
Government’s letter to Chief Constables published in December 2005.  These have 
clearly been chosen to be geographically adjacent, and we distinguish different police 
services by region. The number of mergers proposed differs amongst regions, with a 
single merged police service proposed for Wales, but up to six different mergers 
proposed for the South East. There are 28 proposed mergers in all. 
 In computing the linear programmes we expressed all data in terms of ratios of 
the sample mean for each variable for each year5.  This has the advantage of 
removing major differences in the absolute size of the dimensions and units of the 
variables. The availability of a panel of data allows us to improve the interpretation of 
the results in two ways.  First we are able to compare the consistency of the findings 
about merger efficiency across different years in a period during which the police 
service was undergoing major challenges.  Secondly, we are able to apply the 
suggestion of Ruggiero (2004) that using data on inputs and outputs that have been 
averaged over a number of periods reduces the problem of measurement error. 
Consequently we use five datasets on which to evaluate the mergers: each of the years 
2001-04 separately, and the average of the years 2001-04.  The next Section presents 
the merger model to be estimated. 
 
 
III. THE DEA MODEL OF THE GAINS FROM MERGERS OF 
PRODUCTION UNITS 
 
The analysis of merger potential usually exploits the idea of sub-additivity of the cost 
functions of producers.  In considering the police service, we argue that a production 
model that incorporates the choice of the level of public goods that can be provided 
by exogenous inputs is appropriate.  This requires a re-formulation of the cost sub-
additivity test to present an output orientation.  We begin by setting out the 
                                                 
5  All of the linear programmes for the data envelopment analysis and the merger evaluations were 
written by the authors in GAMS (General Algebraic Modelling System) software. 
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assumptions about the relevant technology.  We define a production set describing 
how l outputs, , are made by m inputs  l+∈Ry m+∈ Rx
 
( ) ( ){ }yxyx,yx,  make can :T =   [1] 
 
From this we can define an equivalent representation of the technology, the output 
possibility set : ( )xP
 
( ) ( ){ }xyx,y:yx  for given TP ∈=  [2] 
 
We shall assume throughout the paper that these representations of the technology 
have the properties of convexity and free disposability.  These assumptions ensure 
that convex combinations of feasible inputs-output baskets are also feasible, and that 
inputs are not congested in the sense that using more of one input requires use of more 
of the other inputs, and that none of the outputs is undesirable.  Assumptions 
concerning returns to scale of the technology are critical for the analysis of mergers 
and are considered in more detail below. 
 We adapt the standard theory of the firm producing private outputs to develop 
an output valuation function.  This is the public service counterpart to the private 
firm’s revenue function, and it is defined as follows.  Given a set of exogenous output 
valuations, that is, the government’s imputed shadow prices of public service 
outputs,p , the output valuation function is the maximum value of technically feasible 
outputs when inputs are given exogenously.  
 
( ) ( ){ }xyyppx
y
P:max,W ∈′=   [3] 
 
In examining police services in the UK we observe that the assumption that 
inputs are exogenous is indeed plausible.  The outputs include services which have the 
characteristics of public goods and are provided at a level which reflects the efficient 
choices of each police service.  Consequently a valuation of output maximisation 
model is the most sensible representation.  The output valuations are not market prices 
but the Government’s chosen valuations of the public good outputs of the police 
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services, and consequently are exogenous to each police service, and can be assumed 
to be identical over all regions of the country. 
 Output Valuation super-additivity will (weakly) justify a merger if the merged 
valuation is not less than the aggregate individual valuations.  For example, in the 
case of two producers, a and b, a merger is justified if:  
 
( ) ( ) ( )pxpxpxx ,W,W,W baba +≥+    [4] 
 
By duality, this is equivalent to super-additivity of the output possibility sets6: 
 
( ) ( ) ( )baba PPP xxxx +⊆+             [5] 
 
The Bogetoft and Wang (2005) model used in this paper evaluates mergers by 
calibrating the super-additivity of the piecewise linear representations of the output 
possibility sets with and without mergers.  This allows us to evaluate mergers without 
requiring output price or valuation data.  We are assuming in effect that all the service 
providers face the same output prices or valuations at any given time.  This makes 
sense in a public good model of a democracy with regional jurisdictions such as the 
UK.  The assumption states that the Government’s implicit valuation of police service 
outputs is the same for all citizens wherever they live.  It would be defensible to 
extend this constancy over short periods of time in order to use a panel data set; 
however the way in which we shall use our data panel in this paper does not explicitly 
require this extended assumption of the constancy of output valuations over time. 
 We investigate a merger as a collection of firms for which the inputs and 
outputs have been combined.  Assume that J of the N police forces are merged, and 
arbitrarily re-labelled within the merged group.  A merged group, that is, 
what Färe et al (1994) call an out of sample or hypothetical firm, has inputs and 
outputs that are the summations of the inputs and outputs of the merged firms: 
Jk K1=
 
mi,xx~
Jk
k
ik
J
i K1
1
=∑= =
=
   [6] 
                                                 
6  The output possibility set is super-addititive because it is a “less than” set bounded above by the 
production possibility frontier, see Färe, Grosskopf and Lovell (1994, p.38). 
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lr,yy~
Jk
k
rk
J
r K1
1
=∑= =
=
   [7] 
 
The objective is to compute measures of Overall Merger Efficiency,  , and 
to decompose this into constituent components.  First, we calculate an output-
orientated radial measure of overall merger efficiency, F
JF
J, to evaluate the relative 
efficiency of a proposed merger of J forces, subject to constraints which define a 
piecewise linear representation of the output possibility set.  A piecewise linear 
representation of the output possibility set is based on observations of the input and 
output vectors of the N forces, collected in the matrices: X and  Y, and a set of non-
negative intensity weights, λ :  
 
( ) { }x0yYxXyx givenfor,,,:P PLR ≥≥≤= λλλ  [8] 
 
Subsequently we make use of the vectors:  to represent the input and output 
slack variables respectively in [8].  
+− ss ,
 The overall evaluation of merger efficiency uses the aggregated inputs and 
outputs from [6] and [7] in the model: 
 
0
1
1
1
1
≥
=≥∑
=≤∑
=
=
=
=
j
J
r
J
Nj
j
rjj
J
i
Nj
j
ijj
J
lr,y~Fy
mi,x~x
.t.sFmax
λ
λ
λ
K
K
    [9] 
 
This suggests the merger is advantageous if , i.e. the merged group could 
produce greater aggregate outputs with the same input usage, and it is not 
advantageous if . 
1>JF
1≤JF
 
 The key to understanding the model’s results is that we measure the potential 
for efficiency gains.  This means that to achieve the gains which the model 
demonstrates are possible, appropriate incentive mechanisms must be in place.  The 
model does not state that the gains will be achieved by the indicated merger.  It states 
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only that there is a potential gain to the merger arising from the measured inefficiency 
of the aggregated forces.  If no such inefficiency exists either because the forces are 
already efficient, or because the merger group is infeasibly large for the reference 
technology, then the merger is not advantageous.  If inefficiency of the feasible 
merged group is observed, relative to the chosen reference technology, then the 
merger may be beneficial if it is accompanied by incentives designed to capture the 
efficiency gains. In the absence of the relevant incentives, the merger will presumably 
fail to achieve its potential.  The test embodied in the model tells the investigator 
whether there could be a positive return to better incentive design within a merged 
group of forces. 
 The specification of returns to scale of the reference technology is important in 
the evaluation of the merger possibilities because by definition a merged group of 
forces is a rescaling of the individual forces in the group.  For constant returns to 
scale, CRS, the piecewise linear representation requires that intensity weights are non-
negative: Njj K1,0 =≥λ .  For variable returns to scale, VRS, the requirement is 
.  These technologies are nested, with the VRS 
reference technology being a subset of the CRS reference technology
1 and,1,0
1
=∑=≥ =
=
Nj
j
jj Nj λλ K
7. 
 Bogetoft and Wang (2005, proposition 1) demonstrate that a CRS reference 
technology has the necessary and sufficient conditions to ensure that FJ ≥ 1 for 
arbitrary mergers.  However for a VRS reference technology, these conditions may not 
hold and it is possible that there will fail to be a feasible solution to the linear 
programme defined by [9].  That would not of course imply that the merger itself was 
infeasible in a practical sense.  Infeasibility of the non-parametric programme [9] 
would signify that the merged output vector was too large to be feasible relative to the 
chosen reference technology, or that the merged inputs vector could not be made 
available by combining the observed inputs in a feasible way relative to the chosen 
reference technology, that is, by non-negative intensity weights which summed to 
unity. 
 In this paper we are investigating a set of hypothetical mergers comprising a 
wide range of different forces.  Consequently we can think of the range of potential 
mergers as comprising a blue-print for the organisational structure of the police 
                                                 
7  The CRS reference technology is a convex cone containing the observed points in input-output space, 
while the VRS reference technology is the convex hull of the observed points. 
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service.  In principle any subset of the potential mergers may be evaluated as a 
potential candidate for implementation, and the implementation has the characteristics 
of a long run decision with no pre-determined factors.  This strongly suggests that for 
overall merger efficiency measurement, the CRS reference technology is the 
appropriate benchmark.  This is the one on which we focus for overall merger 
efficiency, although we do calculate the VRS case to check for programme 
infeasibility. 
 Bogetoft and Wang (2005) suggest a decomposition of the overall merger 
efficiency into three components, the individual technical efficiency effect, JT , a 
harmony, scope or mixture effect, JH , and a scaling or size effect, .  The 
decomposition is multiplicative: 
JS
 
JJJJ SHTF ××=      [10] 
 
The individual technical efficiency effect adjusts the merged outputs for potential 
efficiency gains within the group as each member is given incentives to reach the 
frontier for the group.  In this paper we compute the individual technical efficiency 
effect model for the VRS case.  Our argument is that, unlike the situation when we are 
contemplating the range of potential mergers which is analogous to a long-run 
blueprint for the police service, within each actual merger there will be short-run 
difficulties and adjustments in forging a united group.  The preferences and customs 
of the individual agents amongst other factors will add to this difficulty, and 
consequently it is more appropriate to adopt a less flexible reference technology when 
computing the within merger efficiency-adjusted outputs.  Consequently, the 
individual technical efficiency effects index is a radial measure of the component of 
overall merger efficiency which can be attributed to the effect on each of the members 
of the merged group of achieving the frontier efficiency of the group8. 
 The second component of the decomposition identified by Bogetoft and Wang 
(2005) is a form of economies of scope effect.  However this does not arise from the 
merger of forces with different output portfolios in the textbook sense of economies 
of scope, but rather from the merger of different output mixes from a given set of 
inputs.  The merged group can adopt an output mix which is intermediate amongst the 
                                                 
8  Each of the models for the component effects is shown in the appendix. 
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different output mixes of the individual members.  In effect it is exploiting the 
concavity of the piecewise linear representation of the production possibility frontier 
of the output possibility set.  Using the indicator HJ to measure the mixture effect, 
values of the indicator HJ > 1 state that harmonising the output mix within the merged 
groups will improve efficient merger performance, and values HJ < 1 state that the 
problem of harmonising very different output mixes will detract from merger 
performance.  Bogetoft and Wang (2005) argue that any remaining efficiency gains 
must be due to scale efficiency.  This reflects the fact that the merged group will be 
able to take advantage of its size relative to other producers to exploit any remaining 
returns to scale.  This effect may be opposite  to the other efficiency gains if the police 
service generally is subject to decreasing returns to scale, signalled for example by the 
component forces each having decreasing returns to scale.  The scale effect is 
computed as a residual after adjusting merged outputs for technical efficiency and 
scope or harmony effects.  
 Care needs to be exercised in distinguishing these components of the 
decomposition of overall merger efficiency since each follows in a sequence of prior 
adjustments to the out-of-sample data representing the merged group.  The next 
Section discusses our findings on efficiency in merging English and Welsh police 
forces. 
 
 
IV.  RESULTS 
 
Although we have computed results for both samples with and without London, we 
concentrate here on the results for the sample without the police services in London.  
We begin in Table 2 with a benchmark analysis of the whole sample of 41 police 
forces in order to indicate the relative performance of each of the different police 
forces.  This is reported for the average of the panel samples over the period 2001-04, 
and indicates which police forces are the efficient peers of the others, and the inputs 
and outputs which are given the positive weight in determining the relative output-
orientated efficiency of each force.  The dual to each envelopment model is a 
multiplier model with dual variables which are the components of the marginal rates 
of substitution and transformation between inputs and outputs.  By the complementary 
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slackness theorem of linear programming, we know that positive slacks in the 
envelopment input and output constraints are associated with zero values for the 
corresponding input and output multiplier weights in the dual to the DEA programme: 
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Consequently, we can identify positive multiplier weights with input and 
output dimensions in which each police force is fully constrained, and therefore we 
can identify the absent inputs and outputs as ones where the police force has positive 
slack. In Table 2, we further identify the returns to scale region in which each police 
force operates and the measure of its scale efficiency. 
 
TABLE 2 HERE 
 
The average inefficiency of police forces is 24.5 percent relative to the CRS 
reference technology and fully 24 percent of this is due to scale inefficiency.  Of the 
sample of 41 services, 35 are operating with decreasing returns to scale, and this 
suggests that the potential for large efficiency gains due to mergers is limited, at least 
when using the inputs and outputs employed in this model.  Three forces act as peers 
for all of the others, Durham, Greater Manchester and Lincolnshire.  
 It is clear that scale efficiency in these data will not able to contribute strongly 
to forming a case for mergers in the context of this crime clear-up model of police 
activity.  Among the reasons for this is the clustering of the majority of police forces 
in the DRS space of the reference technology.  This may arise if one or two police 
forces are acting as super-efficient outliers whose CRS performance pulls the frontier 
away from the majority of other police services.  One possible reason for this is that 
since crime may be concentrated in major cities, police forces with large city 
jurisdiction may exhibit different efficiency characteristics than others.  We 
performed an Andersen-Petersen (1993) super-efficiency analysis to determine 
whether this was the case.  The super-efficient police forces are then ranked by the 
size of multiplicative factor which can either expand the inputs without removing that 
service from the efficient production frontier, or contract the outputs without 
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removing that force from the efficient production frontier.  Andersen-Petersen (1993) 
super-efficiency results for the pooled average sample are given in Table 3.  The 
results indicate that Lincolnshire (15) is an extreme outlier whose presence is strongly 
distorting the efficiency results.  This is a surprising result because Lincolnshire does 
not contain a major city of the scale of Manchester or Birmingham; nevertheless it is 
clearly a distorting outlier. 
 
TABLE 3 HERE 
 
As a consequence, we re-computed the overall DEA efficiency scores, and the 
merger efficiency gains, for a sample excluding Lincolnshire.  The finding of 
prevalent decreasing returns to scale is confirmed again, but this time there are no 
extreme outliers amongst the list of efficient forces, which comprise: Durham (2), 
Cleveland (3), Greater Manchester (6), Warwickshire (21), Devon & Cornwall (35) 
and Hampshire (39).  It appears therefore that in this public good model of the police 
service, where the discretionary outputs are crime clear-up and service availability, 
size does not confer efficiency advantages.  Larger police forces, that is, those with 
larger budgets and greater recorded crime levels, do not demonstrate an ability to 
achieve greater clear-up rates relative to recorded crime.  This is confirmed in Figure 
2 where we plot the normalised average crime clear-up rate against police force 
budgets as the input scale variable. Lincolnshire is excluded from Figure 2.  The two 
dominant forces are Durham and Greater Manchester, and, of these, Durham has an 
average budget level substantially less than the median value for the other forces.  
Durham’s small scale but high clear-up is instrumental in pushing many services into 
the decreasing returns to scale area of input-output space. 
 Although Figure 2 does not represent exactly the multi-variable model we 
have used, we can represent several ideas on this figure.  We superimpose, for 
example two different convex cones enveloping the data and labelled CRS1 (includes 
Durham) and CRS2 (excludes Durham).  These give an approximate indication of the 
incidence of the CRS reference technologies.  We also superimpose two different 
convex hulls enveloping the data and labelled VRS1 (includes Greater Manchester) 
and VRS2 (excludes Greater Manchester).  The broken line labelled AA’ is of interest 
because under an output-oriented data envelopment analysis model, points to the right 
of this line will be categorised as decreasing returns to scale, whereas in an input 
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orientation these points would be categorised as increasing returns to scale.  This 
ambiguity arises because these points are so far from the frontier that either smaller 
input scale with constant output or larger output scale with constant input will 
improve their efficiency9.  
 
FIGURE 2 HERE 
 
We turn now to investigate the efficiency gains of the proposed mergers and 
their decomposition into technical efficiency effects, scope (or mixture) effects, and 
scale effects.  We report each of these with respect to the CRS reference technology 
since we argued that they represent a possible blue-print of the organisational 
structure and therefore can be regarded as a range of possible long run decisions.  
Within each merged group however we adjust the members’ efficient input levels 
with reference to the VRS reference technology of the group, since we anticipate that 
any one particular merger must be subject to short run costs of adjustment.  Clearly 
other approaches are possible, and we have investigated these as well, as we report 
subsequently.  In Table 4 we report the merger efficiency gains derived from the 
averaging of the individual samples over the period 2001-04.  We have excluded the 
extreme outlier Lincolnshire from the reference technology, and consequently not 
computed merger efficiency gains where the proposed merger includes Lincolnshire. 
 
TABLE 4 HERE 
 
To read Table 4, it is important to reflect on what has been measured.  The 
merged forces have been constructed simply by summing the inputs and outputs of 
the component forces.  The resulting summation of forces could potentially lie on the 
or below the efficient frontier constructed from all of the existing forces. If it lies 
below the efficient frontier, (FJ >1), then the merged force offers the potential to 
improve efficiency by an expansion of outputs equivalent to [100× (FJ-1 )]%.  
Alternatively, it might be argued that, for given crime incidence and reporting, the 
same level of service that exists in the current forces could be provided at a saving in 
police budgets of [100× (FJ-1 )]%.  The assumption underlying this is that the relevant 
                                                 
9 For discussion of this ambiguity see Färe et al (1994, pp 122-4). 
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incentive mechanisms are in place after merger to achieve the potential efficiency 
gains.  The analysis shows only how far a simple summation of two or more forces 
lies from the efficient frontier. it does not imply that the potential efficiency 
improvements will automatically follow from the merger.  Indeed the hidden 
adjustment costs may be sufficiently large to prevent the potential gains from being 
achieved.  That is why it is important to reflect that this is not a cost-benefit analysis.  
It displays what could be theoretically possible before adjustment costs are taken into 
account, not what will happen in practice when adjustment costs actually occur. 
Technical efficiency improvements are indicated in 11 of the proposed 
mergers covering a range of 2-10% efficiency improvements.  This may 
underestimate the long-run technical efficiency gains that are available because we 
compared this to a relatively conservative close envelopment frontier assuming 
variable returns to scale at the group level.  Nevertheless, assuming that the crime 
clear up rate remained constant, this technical efficiency improvement could translate 
as the equivalent increase in the public good measured as availability of the police 
service, and would be equivalent to a 2-10% reduction in days lost due to sickness.  
The results indicate that the major efficiency gains arise because of the substantial 
variability in the supply of the public good form of output.  When two forces are 
merged the analysis seeks the efficiency gain that comes from combining the best 
output achievements of the merged group relative to the national picture.  The 
assumption is that when two or more forces merge, the availability of the public good 
in the best of them becomes a potential target for every member of the group.  As an 
example consider the simple merger of forces 7 and 8:  Merseyside and Cheshire 
(merger number 5, Table 1).  The indication is that there is a potential for over 60% 
improvement in efficiency.  This does not arise from size since both forces exhibit 
decreasing returns to scale, and only 2% of the gain is associated with each improving 
its pure technical efficiency.  The bulk of the gain arises from provision of the public 
good: availability of service.  Looking at the individual results for these two forces in 
table 2, we see immediately that while Cheshire registers availability of service 
(output 2) as a positively weighted output in its efficiency score, Merseyside does not.  
The merged force shows a potential efficiency improvement of over 60% because the 
analysis assumes that Merseyside can aspire to supply the level of police force 
availability that Cheshire already supplies.  There may be cogent reasons to doubt this 
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will occur.  The importance of the exercise is to show what might be possible, and 
from what sources it might arise. 
More broadly, the lesson of these data is that some forces are able to offer far 
greater availability of police service cover than others with similar budgets and clear 
up rates and crimes reported.  The reasons for this are clearly an important topic for 
further research.  They may be related to the nature of city versus rural policing, or to 
the range of socio-income grouping in different jurisdictions.  As usual with data 
envelopment analysis, we do not learn the answers, but we do learn what questions to 
ask.  
We already noted the prevalence of decreasing returns to scale in this public 
good production model of the police service.  This could be expected to undermine 
the case for mergers, and it is indeed clear that the size or scale index indicates that in 
every case there is no advantageous merger on this criterion alone.  However all of the 
proposed mergers are advantageous when other effects are added in.  
 The major improvement from the mergers comes about through the scope or 
mixture effect in this police force model.  As table 2 indicated, only a minority of 
forces make use of the second, public good, output, representing the availability of 
police service, in computing their maximal efficiency.  The mergers allow the merged 
groups to take full advantage of the concavity of the frontier of the piecewise linear 
representation of the output possibility set to find combinations of the two outputs 
which are more efficient than the individual levels of provision. 
 The other aspect of merger not investigated here is operational efficiency in 
terms of costs and expenditures.  This may offer conflicting results.  However, by 
adopting a public good model of the police service we have shown that mergers allow 
the forces to offer a more efficient range of outputs than is currently the case.  These 
gains are independent of the size of the merged groups and the nature of this model of 
the police service indicates that size itself offers no potential efficiency gains. 
 
 
V. CONCLUSIONS. 
 
This paper is the first to utilise a new non-parametric techniques, proposed by 
Bogetoft and Wang (2005), to analyse English and Welsh police force mergers.  In 
line with previous studies in policing, we estimate a model that includes costs, but 
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also a public good, ‘number of days worked’ relative to sickness days.  As discussed, 
the police service is often cited as a classic example of a public good, since it can be 
argued that it provides a service which is both non-rival in consumption and non-
excludable.  We used this idea to set up a framework in which the production activity 
of the police service uses exogenously determined inputs to provide two outputs, at 
least one of which has the characteristics of a pure public good, and the other output is 
provided by the public sector without a specific user charge. 
 Furthermore, the results obtained provide some important insights not only in 
terms of the relative efficiency of police forces, but also in respect of where the 
efficiencies from merging forces might come from.  We find that there are possible 
efficiency savings associated with staff resources between 10 and 70% after merging 
forces in line with the Home Secretary’s guidelines.  That is, some forces are able to 
offer far greater availability of police service cover than others with similar budgets 
and clear up rates and crimes reported.  Merging forces would therefore allow a 
greater pool of talent within the new force and would increase the economic good 
associated with policing in England and Wales. 
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APPENDIX: models for the decomposition of potential merger gains 
The individual technical efficiency effect applies to the units within the merged group 
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This provides a new set of merged group outputs after the efficiency adjustment: 
lr,y~y~E
lr,yFy~E
J
r
J
r
Jk
k
rk
kJ
r
K
K
1
1
1
=≥⇒
=∑= =
=    [A2] 
Using these within-merger efficiency-adjusted outputs, re-compute the overall model: 
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The first element in the decomposition is: JJJ *FFT = . The purpose of the 
harmony, scope or mixture effect, JH , is to calculate by how much  the average 
output of the merged group could have been expanded by use of the average input.  
The required programme is: 
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Finally, the scaling or size effect,  is a residual calculated by the model:  JS
( )
[ ]
0
1
1
1
1
≥
=≥∑
=≤∑
=
=
=
=
j
J
r
JJ
Nj
j
rjj
J
i
Nj
j
ijj
J
lr,y~EHSy
mi,x~x
.t.sSmax
λ
λ
λ
K
K
  [A5] 
 24
  
 
 
 
Figure 1 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 Valuation super-additivity and output possibility super-additivity 
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FIGURE 1 
GEOGRAPHICAL ENGLISH AND WELSH POLICE SERVICE 
BOUNDARIES 
 
1. Northumbria     11. Humberside       21. Warwickshire     31. Essex 
2. Durham      12. S. Yorkshire       22. North Wales     32. Gloucestershire 
3. Cleveland      13. Derbyshire       23. Dyfed Powys     33. Avon & Somerset 
4. Cumbria      14. Nottinghamshire    24. Gwent      34. Wiltshire 
5. Lancashire       15. Lincolnshire       25. South Wales     35. Devon & Cornwell 
6. G. Manchester  16. Leicestershire       26. Norfolk     36. Dorset 
7. Merseyside      17. Northamptonshire  27. Cambridgeshire  37. Thames Valley 
8. Cheshire      18. Staffordshire       28. Suffolk     38. Surrey 
9. N. Yorkshire     19. West Mercia       29. Bedfordshire     39. Hampshire 
10. W. Yorkshire  20. West Midlands      30. Hertfordshire     40. Sussex 
             41. Kent 
 
n.b. blank geographic area denotes City of London and Metropolitan forces which are 
excluded in our analysis. 
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 FIGURE 2 
NORMALISED CRIME CLEAR-UP AND POLICE SERVICE BUDGET  
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 TABLE 1 
PROPOSED MERGERS OF 41 POLICE SERVICES BY REGION 
 
North  East North West Yorkshire & Humberside 
1 Northumbria 4 Cumbria 9 North Yorkshire 
2 Durham 5 Lancashire 10 West Yorkshire 
3 Cleveland 6 Greater 
Manchester 
11 Humberside 
 7 Merseyside 12 South Yorkshire 
 8 Cheshire   
potential mergers   
m1=1+2+3 m1=4+5 m1=9+10+11+12 
 m2 =7+8 m2 =9+10 
 m3 =4+5+7 m3 =11+12 
 m4 =6+8  
East Midlands West Midlands Wales 
13 Derbyshire 18 Staffordshire 22 North Wales 
14 Nottinghamshire 19 West Mercia 23 Dyfed-Powys 
15 Lincolnshire 20 West Midlands 24 Gwent 
16 Leicestershire 21 Warwickshire 25 South Wales 
17 Northamptonshire    
potential mergers   
m1 =13+14+15+16+17   
m2 =13+14 m1 =18+19+20+21 m1 =22+23+24+25 
m3 =15+16+17 m2 =18+19  
 m3 =20+21  
Eastern South West South East 
26 Norfolk 32 Gloucestershire 37 Thames Valley 
27 Cambridgeshire 33 Avon & 
Somerset 
38 Surrey 
28 Suffolk 34 Wiltshire 39 Hampshire 
29 Bedfordshire 35 Devon & 
Cornwall 
40 Sussex 
30 Hertfordshire 36 Dorset 41 Kent 
31 Essex    
potential mergers   
m1 
=26+27+28+29+30+31
m1 
=32+33+34+35+36
m1 =38+40+41 
m2 =29+30+31 m2 =32+33+34+36 m2 =37+39 
m3 =26+27+28  m3 =38+39+40 
m4 =27+29+30  m4 =40+41 
m5 =26+28+31  m5 =38+39 
  m6 =38+40 
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TABLE 2. 
DEA RESULTS FROM SAMPLE OF 41 POLICE SERVICES AVERAGED 
OVER 2001-04 
 
number name CRS 
efficiency 
peers positive 
input 
weights 
positive 
output 
weights 
RTS scale 
eff 
1 Northumbria 0.753 6 1 1 decreasing 0.753 
2 Durham 1.000 2 1 1 constant 1.000 
3 Cleveland 0.816 2, 6, 15 1, 2 1, 2 decreasing 0.820 
4 Cumbria 0.682 2,6 1 1,2 decreasing 0.689 
5 Lancashire 0.709 2, 6 1 1,2 decreasing 0.722 
6 Greater Manchester 1.000 6 1 1,2 constant 1.000 
7 Merseyside 0.564 6 1 1 decreasing 0.586 
8 Cheshire 0.718 2, 6, 15 1, 2 1, 2 decreasing 0.734 
9 North Yorkshire 0.786 2, 6, 15 1, 2 1, 2 decreasing 0.791 
10 West Yorkshire 0.696 6 1 1 decreasing 0.700 
11 Humberside 0.482 2, 6, 15 1,  2 1, 2 decreasing 0.500 
12 South Yorkshire 0.779 6, 15 1, 2 1 decreasing 0.794 
13 Derbyshire 0.618 2, 6 1 1,2 decreasing 0.629 
14 Nottinghamshire 0.716 2,6 1 1,2 decreasing 0.730 
15 Lincolnshire 1.000 15 1, 4 2 constant 1.000 
16 Leicestershire 0.812 2, 6, 15 1, 2 1, 2 decreasing 0.820 
17 Northamptonshire 0.895 2, 6 1 1,2 decreasing 0.895 
18 Staffordshire 0.791 2,6 1 1,2 decreasing 0.801 
19 West Mercia 0.769 2,6 1 1,2 decreasing 0.776 
20 West Midlands 0.846 6 1 1 decreasing 0.846 
21 Warwickshire 0.997 2, 15 1, 2 2 decreasing 0.997 
22 North Wales 0.725 2, 6, 15 1, 2 1, 2 decreasing 0.732 
23 Dyfed-Powys 0.662 2,6 1 1,2 decreasing 0.671 
24 Gwent 0.783 6 1 1 decreasing 0.783 
25 South Wales 0.729 2, 6 1 1,2 decreasing 0.742 
26 Norfolk 0.658 2, 6, 15 1, 2 1, 2 decreasing 0.667 
27 Cambridgeshire 0.715 2,6 1 1,2 decreasing 0.721 
28 Suffolk 0.798 2, 6, 15 1, 2 1, 2 decreasing 0.798 
29 Bedfordshire 0.823 2 1 2 decreasing 0.823 
30 Hertfordshire 0.655 2,6 1 1,2 decreasing 0.659 
31 Essex 0.857 2, 6, 15 1, 2 1, 2 decreasing 0.865 
32 Gloucestershire 0.639 6 1 1 decreasing 0.657 
33 Avon & Somerset 0.496 2,6 1 1,2 decreasing 0.517 
34 Wiltshire 0.694 2, 6, 15 1, 2 1, 2 decreasing 0.698 
35 Devon & Cornwall 0.880 2, 6, 15 1, 2 1, 2 decreasing 0.884 
36 Dorset 0.810 2, 6, 15 1, 2 1, 2 decreasing 0.817 
37 Thames Valley 0.637 6 1 1 decreasing 0.644 
38 Surrey 0.584 2, 6, 15 1, 2 1, 2 decreasing 0.598 
39 Hampshire 0.847 6, 15 1, 2 1 decreasing 0.854 
40 Sussex 0.618 2, 6 1 1,2 decreasing 0.632 
41 Kent 0.650 2, 6 1 1,2 decreasing 0.664 
        
 mean 0.749     0.756 
 standard deviation 0.128     0.123 
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TABLE 3: 
ANDERSEN-PETERSEN (1993) SUPER-EFFICIENCY SCORES FOR THREE 
FRONTIER POLICE SERVICES 
 
service Andersen-Peteresen  super-
efficiency score input 
orientation 
Andersen-Peteresen  
super-efficiency score 
output orientation 
2 Durham 1.502 0.666 
6 Greater Manchester 1.412 0.708 
15 Lincolnshire 6.817 0.147 
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TABLE 4 
EFFICIENCY SCORES AND DECOMPOSITION FOR 26 PROPOSED 
MERGERS 
 
merger merger group F(J) 
overall 
index for 
J merged 
DMUs 
F(*J) 
index for 
efficient 
merged 
DMUs 
T(J ) = 
F(J)/F(*J) 
technical 
efficiency 
index 
H(J) 
scope 
index for  
merged 
DMUs 
S(J) size 
index for  
merged 
DMUs 
1 1_2_3 1.268 1.180 1.074 1.180 1.000 
2  4_5 1.436 1.436 1.000 1.436 1.000 
3 4_5_7 1.592 1.592 1.000 1.592 1.000 
4 6_8 1.109 1.109 1.000 1.109 1.000 
5  7_8 1.602 1.571 1.020 1.571 1.000 
6  9_10 1.466 1.466 1.000 1.466 1.000 
7 9_10_11_12 1.583 1.475 1.073 1.475 1.000 
8 11_12 1.585 1.585 1.000 1.585 1.000 
9 13_14 1.516 1.516 1.000 1.516 1.000 
10 18_19 1.282 1.282 1.000 1.282 1.000 
11 18_19_20_21 1.244 1.244 1.000 1.244 1.000 
12 20_21 1.219 1.219 1.000 1.219 1.000 
13 22_23_24_25 1.384 1.341 1.032 1.341 1.000 
14  26_27_28 1.423 1.329 1.071 1.329 1.000 
15 26_27_28_29_30_31 1.449 1.338 1.083 1.338 1.000 
16 26_28_31 1.229 1.161 1.059 1.161 1.000 
17 27_29_30 1.437 1.354 1.061 1.354 1.000 
18 29_30_31 1.464 1.394 1.051 1.394 1.000 
19 32_33_34_35_36 1.676 1.519 1.103 1.519 1.000 
20 32_33_34_36 1.715 1.592 1.077 1.592 1.000 
21 37_39 1.384 1.384 1.000 1.384 1.000 
22 38_39 1.211 1.211 1.000 1.211 1.000 
23 38_39_40 1.470 1.470 1.000 1.470 1.000 
24 38_40 1.683 1.683 1.000 1.683 1.000 
25 38_40_41 1.642 1.642 1.000 1.642 1.000 
26 40_41 1.576 1.576 1.000 1.576 1.000 
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